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A HISTORY OF THE MONETARY COMPENSATORY  AMOUNTS
The AgriculturaI Unit of Account
In the absence of a common European currency,  when the Common AgricutturaL
PoLicy was established in 1962, common prices b,ere expressed in the notionaI
currency of the unit of account. The actuat transactions were effected in natio-
naL currencies, the amount being catcuLated by appLying a fixed exchange rate to
the price expressed in unjts of account. In the 1960's the U.A. was estabLjshed
on a par with the US doL[ar (0.88867088 grammes of goLd). At that time Community
members operated a system of fixed exchange rates, as set down in the Bretton
Woods conference, decLaring a parity rate to the I.M.F. and Iim'iting fLuctuations
to 1 %.
This currency stabil.ity simptified the expression of common prices in each
of the nationaI currencies. A simpLe equation was aLI that was required :
1 U.A. = FL 3.62 = Dl4 4.00 = FF 4.937A6 = Bfr/ Lfr 50 = Lit 625.
In other words, when the common agricutturaL market was finatLy estabLished
and common guaranteed prices introduced in 1967rthe farmer receivedrfon  agricuLtu-
ral produce worth 100 UA, a minimum price of HFL 362 in the Nethertands, FF 493.70 in
Francerand  DM 400 in Germany,(without taking transport costs into account). Quite
cLearl.y, revaLuations and devaLuations  distort these reLationships  and such distor-
tions create prob[ems as negards the unifonmity of agnicuLturaI pnices and free
trade within the Community. UnfortunateLy this has been borne out aIL'too often
in practi ce.
The deva[uation of the French franc
At the end of the 1960's, the retative economjc stabitity of the era was
tost.  Diffening rates of infLation and unempLoyment,  and divergence in the
economic progress of member states, particuIar[y France and Germany, Led to
pressures developing which cuLminated in the Late sixties when the weakness of
the French franc and the strength of the German Mank demanded parity changes.
On 11th August 1969 the French franc was devatued by 11.11 7.. When a
country deva[ues its  currency, its agricuLturaL prices (i.e.  common prices
fixed in U.A.as expressed in the nationaL currency) shouLd normaL[y increase to
the same extent, as the nationaL currency unit becomes worth [ess in terms of
U.A. If  the market for agricuLturaL produce is in surpLus the manket price
fol[ows ctoseLy the intervent'ion price.  For those products which are not in
surp[us, an increase occurs at a stower rate as the market price adjusts.
Since 1 U.A. = FF 5.55 instead of FF 4.93706, the French farmer wou[d normaLty
have received FF 555 fon produce worth 100 U.A. instead of FF 493170. Such a price increase would have resuLted in higher food prices in the shops, with possi-
bly a reduction in demand in the domestic market as weLL as a stimuLation of production. It  wouLd atso have been extremeLy difficuLt to exptain to producers
in the other member states why they shou[d not enjoy the advantages which had been
thrust upon their French competitors out of the btue, and to workers in the
non-agricuLturaI  sector in the same member state who wouLd see higher food prices
as justifying  increased wage demands. AccordingLy it  was decided that the
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graduaLLy i.e. over a two-yean period.
The difficutties connected with an overnight increase in the minimum
gua.ranteed pri-ces were thus aLteviated, but at the same time new problems
btere created as the rate of exchange for the U.A. in the nationaL currency
(the "green" rate onLy used fon agricutturaL purposes) now differed from the
market exchange rate.  A French
producer coutd have so[d his produce into intervention in another member
state, whene the authorities wou[d have been obLiged to accept the products
.at the guaranteed price in U.A., expressed in national currency at the fixed
rate of exchange. The West German authorities, for exampLe, woutd have
to pay DM 400 for grain worth 100 U.A. and this amount could immediateLy
have been exchanged by the producer at any bank for French francs catcutated
at the market rate i.e. for FF 555. Fnench producers would thus have been ab[e
to benefit immediateLy from the pnice rise.  In order to prevent intervention
agencies in other member states being inundated with French produceor wjth
disptaced domestic produce, a system of frontier subsidies on imports into
France and taxes on exports known as monetary compensatory  amounts (MCArs) was
intnoduced,  whereby French producers Lost the price advantage created by the
currency devaluation and, at the same t'ime, producers jn other member states
were protected against c_ompetit'ion from cheaper French products.
The revatuation of the German Mark
Two months Later the singLe market ideaL was further undermined by the reva[ua-
tion of the German Mark by 9.29 %. This created a reverse situation to that
which occured after the devatuation of the French Franc.In theory this shouId irave
had the effect of reducing Genman minimum prices,but on poLiticaL grounds,such a
reduction in farmersr income was cLearLy out of the question. It  was therefore
decided to maintain agriculturaL  pnices at the o[d [eve[, but this created
new probtems, Just as the deva[uation of the French franc had threatened to
fLood the other member states with French agricuLturaI produce, there was now
a risk that Germany woutd become the export target for the harvests of the
Community.  The reasons were two fo[d:  in the first  place, alI  Community
producers couLd undercut German producers in every market; in the second pIace,
the German authorities  were stiLt offering DM 400 fon every 100 u.A. of
produce. Reckoned in terms of the actuat rate for the German Mark (3.66 DM
= 1 U.A.) this meant that farmers in othen countnies setting to the German
intervention  agency cou[d have received 9"29 % nore in their own currency than
they woutd have made if  they had soLd their products for the intervention
price in their hometand.  Once again, monetary compensatory  amounts had to
be introduced,  meaning that export subsidjes were paid to German producers to
offset the [oss of price competitiveness on other markets whiLe the advantages
accruing to the producens jn other memben states were removed by the imposition
of imoont taxes"
Devetopments since 1971
MCArs were introduced as a form of protection for the intervention system
of the CAP and to avoid trade distortions. An export Levy was imposed to
remove the incentive for French traders to seLI into intervention abroad, and
to stop specuLators buyingup farm products cheapty in France with the view
to a quick profit in German intervention stores. A subsidy was paid on imports
into France to a[[ow for the loss in competitiveness of the now relative[y
higher priced produce of other member states. The system appLied for Germany
in reverse of that for France with subsidies on exponts and [evies on imports.
The vatue of the MCArs depended on the difference  between the "green rate"
and the market rate of exchange between the nationaL currency and the unit of
account. These monetany percentage differences  r^lere then apptied to certain
common prices, jn onder to caLcutate the absoLute vaLues of MCAts to be charged
on refunded, In essence then they measured the effect on prices of the
difference between the rates of exchanqe"
Arrangements were made to aL'ign French prices on the common price [evet in
France by devaLuation of the green rate over a two year period, and in Genmany
by reva[uation of the green rate over a four year period.  However, the use3.
of MCArs expanded and continued into the 1970rs in -an effort to maintain the
uni!of the market after aLI European currencies broke away from fixed parity
with the US dol[ar and hence with the U.A.
In August 1971, the US put an end to the convertibiLity of the dotLar
into gotd and the dotLar began to f[oat on the worLd currency mankets. ]n
December of the same year, the otd system was repLaced by the Smithsonign
.Ag.reement whereby the countries agreed to Limit parity f Luctuations to :  2.25  7,
bf the decIared centraI rate.  West Germany, Betgium, Luxembourg, the NetherLands
and France decided in March 1972 to Limit their exchange rate fLuctuations to
t  1.125 % lorning a "snake" within the "tunneL" of the Smithsonian  Agreement.
"Green" exchange rates were stiLI using the Last decLared I.M.F. parity rate.
With the accession of the U.K., Denmark and Iretancj, this rate was
considered impracticaL and "representative rates" were introduced for those
countries based on the exchange nate in 1973 of the dottar to the pound for exampLe.
The second devaluation of the dollan in the spring of 1973 prompted the decision
of the "snake" currencies to abandon their [ink with the do[tar and to fLoat
jointLy.  The basis of caLcuLation of MCArs was not.r the unweighted avenage of
these currencies and the U,A. was dependent for its vatue on their general
appreciation or depreciation. The market and green rates of exchange for
the "snake" currencies and hence the MCAts were thus fixed.  Outside the "snake"
however  MCArs remained variabIe as the member states concerned had ftoat'ing
currencies.
Between 1971 and 1978, the German and Benetux currencies  were atL revaLued
i.e. the DM by 15.11 %, the GuiLder by 7.76 % and the Belgian franc 6y 2.76 %.
The Danish krone devalued by a totaL of 13 7i. The national currencies of
Italy, France, the U.K. and IreLand were f[oated, which amounted in practice
to the devatuation of each of the currencies but by different amounts. The
fact that the vaLue of the U,A. was Linked to that of the "snake" currencies,
and the German Mark in particular, meant that the green rates in the free-
fLoating currencies  were overvaLued due to their steady and rapid depreciation
against the joint-fLoat, resuIting in increasing negative MCAts, particuLarLy
in the cases of the U.K., IreLand and ItaLy, whose cLrrrencies depreciated
rapidLy after 1974.
Monetary compensatory  amounts
Monetary gap appIicab[e on :
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-1.1 I  Oli'l
. t  ItaLy, Denmarkrand Ireland since 1976, have systematicaLLy attempted to avoid
t^  the introducti6n of negative MCA|s or at Least to [imit the'ir amount, in order
to take advantage of higher farm incomes and avojd or reduce the Levies on
their agricuIturat exports, The United Kingdom, as a net agricuLturaI importer
preferred to avojd a devaLuation of the green rate thus keeping prices Lower
for consumers.  However, the strengthening of sterLing against the doILan in
1979/80 heLped to eLiminate the UKrs negative MCArs and [ead to the introduction
of positive MCArs without the UK seeking any drastic devaLuation of the green
rate. .ALL member states with revaLued currencies have been reLuctant to revaLue
t"hein green rates, as this wouLd have impLied reduced incomes for farmers and
a cut in import taxes, which provide protection against foreign competitors. As
an importen Germany could have been expected to pness for reduced prices, but
relativety poor farm structures pIus a high 'income leveI in the non-agricuLturat
sector have resuLted in a strong opposition to any reduction in the MCArs-
Longer term effects of the agri-monetary system
Sudden unjntentionaI price movements  due to exchange rate changes have been
avoided with the formation of the agri-monetary  system. In those products
subject to jntervention higher prices have generaLLybeen maintained in countries
where currencies have appreciated and Lower prices in those deprec'iating  currency
countries where [itt[e  adjustment has been made to the green rate'
The use of green rates appeared justified in the short term but some undesirable
effects .beclme apparent jn the Longer tenm" NationaI manipuLation  of price
LeveLs confIicts with the concept of a common agricuLturaL poLicy and common
prices within the EC, though it  js argued that such differentiation  has aLso
provided greater prite stabiLity within member states and avoided sudden poLiti-
ca[[y unacceptabLe changes.
The price LeveL.
Due to the use of the agri-monetary  system the common price Leve[, when expressed
in nationaL currencies, has tended to diverge with the resu[tant effects on
production in member states. The divergence between nationaI prices can be seen
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It  is cLear that producers in member states with revaIued curnencies command  a
higher pnice than their competitors in member states with devaLued currencies-
In the event of an increase in common prices without any change in the MCArs, the
divergence  between nationaI curnencies wouLd be further accentuated. Thus a 10%
price increase wou[d mean that farmers in the FederaL RepubLic  wouLd get DM 283.52
(+ DM 25.75yhereas in France the corresponding figure (in DM) would be only
./..
France 619.564 22s"285. 
:
Dn 245.61 (+ Drvl ?2.33>.  In other words, French farmers would on[y get 87 %
of the actuaL price rise in Germany.
0n the other hand, if  MCArs were eIiminated thjs wou[d aLso have perverse income effects.
Thus, the decision to eradicate MCA!s would Lead to a Lowering of farm prices in
the united Kingdom, Germany and the NetherLands,  which have positive MCArs. If
the common price leveLs were increased at the same time, in order to compensate
for such a falt  in farm incomesrthis  woutd lead to a dnastic increase inprices in
Italy, BeLgium,  Luxembourg and France, as the abotition of negative MCArs rn
those countries wouLd resu[t in increased agricuLturaL support prices in the
natitina[ currency of those countries on top of the increase in common pricesin
U.A.. Denmark,  Greece and IreIand having no MCAts and thus'being effectiveLy
at the common Levet of prices would receive onLy the increase decided by the
Counc i L.
lredgsscs-erd-s9lssser:  :
Had the agri-monetary  system not been introduced, one can assume that higher
product prices woutd have encouraged productjon in certajn branches to sxpsnd
faster in member states with depreciated currencies, within the Limits set by naturaL
conditions and avajLabiLity of resources. simitarLy,  consumption of some foodstuffs
woutd have dectined. The opposite trend wouLd have been apparent in countries with
appreciated currencies. In practice, however, since non-agricuLturaL input prices
reflect normaL market exchange rates, the MCA system actuaLLy discourages production
in weaker currency countries, whereas consumptjon is maintained through [ower prices,
the reverse of what shouLd normaLLy have happened after devaLuation. In countries
with revaLued currencies benefjtting from higher farm prices than their neighbours,
production may be maintained at higher LeveLs than wouLd have been the case.
However, the monetary system is onLy one of a combination of factors which
affect the trend in agricuLturaL production, and it  is difficuLt to isoLate its
influence from the impact of other factors such as soiL and cLimate; structuraI factors;
jncentives from guarantees and price LeveLs resuLtjng from enIargement of the EC;
the generaI economic situation and naturaL disasters. Production trends are atso
affected by surpluses and shortages on the market and by nationaL and Community
poticies. NevertheIess, certain branches of production have been directLy affected.
For exampLe, the production of pnocessed foods jncreased in the UK in particuLar
due to lower prjced raw materiaIs being imported at a subsjdised rate, an additionaI
benefit being that some of these processed foods were not subject to export Levies.
-eJles!:-e!-!regs 
:
The introduction of MCArs, if  maintained for more than a short period,
has a distorting effect on trade, due to the fact that in the main part it  acts
on the endprices of agricuLtural  produce, not on the cost of inputs' The produ-
cer in a country wjth an appreciating currency such as the FederaL Republic,
generatLy benefits from a Lowen rate of infLation as regards the cost of Labour'
equipment  and machinery, and from a reduction in the coit of imported energy and
othen inputs as a dir"ci resuLt of the appneciation of his currency. (In practice
however we find that those reduced costs are seLdom passedon to the farmen)' At
the same time, the MCA system provides him with an export subsidy to offset the
impact of revaLuation on his seLLing price. in othen cunrencies' 0n the other
hand, the producer in a countny with a weaker currency, for exampLe France' even
if  the gneen rate is quickly devalued so as to avoid the introduction of negat'ive
MCArs, generaLLy faces a h'igher rate of infLation in the cost of his inputs'
particuLarLy for imported energy, ferti Liser-or animaI feed' At the same time'
the positive MCAns jn Germany mean that the French producerts saLes to that country
have to pay an export Levy whi.i-f."u"nts him from'benefitting  from the competitive
advantage which the reLatiu" a"pr!.iation of the franc shou[d have given him on
the German market. To the extelt that the MCArs ane not rapidLy phased out' they
therefore tend to encourage. p"au"rre deve[opment of trade, i.e.  from high
price to Low Price countries".6.
Th.is perverse effect is LikeLy to become significant when the gap between apprecia-
ting and depreciating  currencies  resuLts jn substantiaL cunuLative  MCA payments.
SpecuLat.ion  on currency changes ha> atwa1,5  t.le.ett evicjer:t jn trade. To inc Iude
a cost eLement to cover these changes wouLd increase the price to a teveL where
trade might be Lost. This risk can now partLy be offset by a prefixation of MCArs-
Again a futI anaLysis of the djrect effects of the agri-monetary system on trade
patterns is harpered by the infLuence of other factors.
.  .Budoetarv cost :
The appljcation of MCAts has jmposed a burden on the budget of the EC even though
this has decreased since the jntroduction of the EMS. Those countries which gain
most from budgetary transfers are those net importers with a deprecjating currency
and a non-depreciated gneen rate such as Britain in the mid-seventies. Itaty, too,
has enjoyed subsjdised imports but not to the same extent, as the green Lina has
Ueen periodicaLLy  deva[ued in an attempt to eLjminate the negative  MCA and thus
increase farmersiincomes  and stimuLate production.  On the other hand, positive
filCAts in a net importing countny with an apprec'iating currency such as the FederaI
RepubLic, resuLt in addjtjonaL budgetary receipts for the Community in the form
of impori taxes. As against this, maintaining higher prices Leads to increased
intervention costs. Posjtjve MCArs aLso heLp maintain exports from strong to weak























The use of the ECU
Throughout 1977 there was much debate about the use of a European
Currency Unit in the agricutturaL sector which would be tied to a weighted
basket of a[L member statesrcurrencies.  It  was hoped in th'is way to bring
agricuLturaL poLicy more into Ljne with reaLity. The we'ighted basket vaLue
of the ECU prevents pnicesexpressed in a deprecjating currency being ouLLed
up by the strong curnencies and removes the'inreguLarity  whereby most of the
burden of adjustment faLIs on the weaken currencies-
The substitution of a ECU for the  U.A. invoLved a decision on the
convers'ion rate as the vaLue of the ECU was 20 % beLow the U.A., implying
a Lowering of the common price [eve[ if  adopted on a one-to-one basis.0n
9 th ApriL 1979, the common agricuLtunaL prices expressed in U.A. and
converted into ECU were adjusted by the coefficient 1.208953 (i.e.  1.20 ECU =
1 U.A.). The green rate had also to be adjusted by the same coefficient to
maintain current price levets.
e.g. 100 U.A. x 3"40 = 340 DM
121 ECU x 2.81 = 340 DM
The use of the ECIJ as compared to the U.A. of the pne-EMS period is especiaLLy
'important when considering the excessive negative MCA's of the eanlier period,
as the U,A. was Linked to the "snake" currencies against which the other
currencies tended to depreciate. As the common price Leve[, expressed in the
depreciating  currencies-rose the pressure h,as on the weaker currencies to
devatue their green ratbs and thus increase their domestic prices which wouLd
di ture)  e  '  l.  t'
atready have been rising at a faster rate than the prices in a stronger currency
country. A targe proportion of farm price increases for depreciating currency
countries occured as a result of a devaLuation in green rates rather than by
the annuat decisions on price increases. The MCAfs new[y created within the
EMS tend to be more baLanced between positive and negative. Thus the faciIity
for Large "back doon" pnice increases, particuLar[y in member states wjth above
average infLation rates, is no Longen avaitab[e. This impLies a higher increase
in common prices in ECU to achieve a desired resuLt in terms of farm incomes
than was previousLy the case.
European Monetary System which had the effect of restoring fixed exchange rates
between the participating  member states and reintnoducing fixed margins of
fLuctuation to :  2.25 % for seven currencies and !  6% for the ltaLian [ira.
By these means it  was hoped to bring about a reduction in the need for MCArs.
Provision for a franchise of 1.5 points for those countries with a negative  MCA
was retained, and a net"l franchise of 1 point on net.l positjve MCA!s was adopted
with the specification that such new MCArs wouLd on princip[e be phased out over
th,o years.
SterIing is not at present participating in the scheme, however. AIso
the lta[ian [ira has margins of fluctuations of 6 %. For these reasons, and with
the accession of Greece, the need for MCA|s is stitL apparent. Recent exchange
rate movements within the EMS, after two years of reLative stabiLityrhave  again brought
[rlCArsand their resuLtant probLems into the LimeLight.
It  is generaILy accepted that when a member state modifies its  exchange
rate, it  may seek an immediate adaptation of its green rate in order to avoid
the introduction of MCArs or to Limit their amount. ALmost aLL member states
which have devaLued recent[y haveavajLed themseLves of this possibitity,  at
Least partialLy, but none of the member states wh'ich have revaLued. For the rest,
the adaptation of green rates is generaILy negotiated within the CounciI as
part of the annuaL agriculturaI pnice fixing exercise. The resuLting MCA changes
are normail.y impLemented at the beginning of the market'ing year for the different
produ ct s.-8-
Examptes of exchanges between member states, using butter in a[[ cases, and
taking no transport costs into account (15 th ApriL 1982)
1 . Ersienee-be!!een-e-s!renser-egttgtgy-999!!ty-end-s-!9e!9t-9,str9!9x-999!!rr:
France I  weaker currency countries - negative MCA - tax on exports -
- Betgium I subsidies on imports
Germany I stronger currencies : positive MCA -
HoLtand J on exports
a ) !rgng!-!s!!9r-le-9elssnr
Intervention price 1981/82 butter
tax on imports -  subsidies
3178.40 ECU x 6"A8656 FF (Fnench repnesentative
rate)
i)  French exporter pays MCA to French intervention
board at :
1%x19345.52FF
Price at French border
ii)German importer pays MCA to German intervention
board at :
8 % of 3178.40 ECU x 2.65660 DM (German repre-
sentat ive rate)
1 Dfrt = 2.56212 FF
Price to retaiLer (without transport costs or
profit marg'in)
Compared to German intervention price
=  3178.40 EcU
=  19345.52 FF (1)
=  675.50 DM
=  1730.71 FF (3)
193.45 FF (2)
19538.97 FF (1)+(2)






Inte rvent i on
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to France
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i ) MCA refund to German exporter  :
8 7. x 8443.74 DM
Pnice at German frontier
ii)MCA refund to French imPorter  :
1 % of 3178.40 ECU x 6.08656 FF (French repre-
sentative rate)
Price to retaiLer
Compared to French intervention price






Intervention price 1981/8? butter
3178.40 ECU x 2.8131E HFL (Dutch representative
rate)
'i)'NetherLands exporter receives refund of :
4 7, x 8941.41 HFL
Price at Dutch border
ii)German importer paYs MCA of I
8 % of 3178"4Q ECU x 2.65664 DM (German repre-
sentative rate)
1 DM = 1.10537 HFL
Price to retai Ler
Compared to German intervention price
3. Eulsnss-bs!!99!-!!9-sgsnlrjss-sl!!-ssetser-esIIs!sjss
F r enqh_ bu!lql-!9-9e!g jgg
Intervention price 1981/82 butter
3178.40 ECU x 6.08656 FF (French representative
rate)
i)  French exporter PaYs MCA at :
1%x19345.5?tF
Price at French border
ii)BeL9ian importer receives refund of :
8.1 % x 3178.40 ECU x 40.7985 BF (BeLg'ian repre-
sentative rate)
1 FF = 7.21415 BF
Price to retaiLer
Compared to BeLgian intervention price
3178.40 ECU
8941.41 HFL (1)
=  357.66 HFL (2)
=  8583.75 HFL (1)-(2)
=  675.50  DM
=  746.68 HFL (3)
=  9330.43 HFL (1)-(2)+(3)
=  8441.00 DM
=  8443.74  DM
3178.40 ECU
19345.52 Ft (1)
=  'f 93.45 FF (2)
= 19538.97 FF (1)+(2)
= 10503.59  BF
=  1145.97 FF (3)
= 18093.00 FF (1)+(2)-(3)
=13A525.61 BF
=1?9673.95  BF
Intervention Boards pay the baLance of MCArs received and pajd into EAGGF'
Member states are responsibLe for their own MCArs except in the case of imports into
those countries wjth negative MCArs whereby the exporter pay: the MCA subject to
an agreement between thl countries concerned. This (articLe 2 a of ReguLation 974/71)
was jn operation for ltaty and Greece on 15th Apri[ 1982"- 10-
4. geseeri:e!-e!-!e!!srdes-eJ-!!e-pr!ses-e!-e-Irsnsh-se!:s-end-en-jsper!ed
4rcfigen-gg!:e  (inc [udins transport)
Price of maize CIF Rotterdam (15 th Aprit 8?)
Transhipment
1 doLlar = 2168805 HFL
Levy on the 15 th ApriL
86.12 ECU x 2,81318 (Dutch repr"rate)x 0.96 (*)
Dutch MCA :
4 % (2.81318 x 165.23 ECU (intervention price))
Transport + cost to Dutch factory




1 % (6.08656 (French repr.rate) x 165.23)
Freight Crei [/HoL Iand-Rotterdam
Cost s
Dutch McA 18.59 x 2.31789





=  232.58 HFL
=  18.59 HFL
=  7.50 HFL
629.62 HFL
= 1459.39  FF
= 1205"00 FF
=  102.20 FF
=  10.06 FF
=  76.15 FF
=  I 0.00 FF
1403.41 FF
43.08 FF
= 1446.49 FFrhLgrvHwErF  gnwrl  -  grnEvnE|NnqrE  -  fsEqYHr  I  u|.I\M  -  swE  w  rwlE-nn4E
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HISTOIRE DES MONTANTS COMPENSATOIRES MONETAIRES
L I uni t6 de compte ag ri co Le
Lorsque ta poLitique agricoLe commune fut cr66e en 1962, A un moment ot}
it  ntexistait pas de monnaie europ6enne commune,  Les prix communs 6taient
exprim6s dans La monnaie fictive de Irunitd de compte. Les transactions
r6eLLes se faisaient en monnaies nationaIes, leur montant 6tant caLcu16
par ['application drun taux de change fixe au prix exprim6 en unitds de
compte. Dans Les ann6es 60, lrUC fut cr66e sur La base drune paritd avec
Le doILar amenicain  (0188867088  gramme dror). A Irdpoque, Les Etats
membres de [a Communaut$ appLiquaient  un systdme de taux de change
fixes conform6ment aux accords de Bretton Woods, d6cLarant un rapport
de parit6 au FMI et Limitant Les f[uctuations A 1 %.
Cette stabiLit6 mon6taine simpIifiait La formu[ation  des prix communs
dans chaque monnaie nationaLe. II  suffisait drune simpIe equation  :
1 UC = 3,62 FL = 4100 Dttr = 4P3706 FF = 50 Bfr/Lfr = 625 Lit.
En drautres termes, Lorsque Le March6 commun agricoIe fut finaIement
cr66 et que des prix communs garantis furent introduits en 1967, Lragri-
cuLteur touchait, pour un produit agrico[e vaLant 100 UC, un prix minimum
de 362 HFL aux Pays-Bas, 493170 FF en France et 400 DM en ALlemagne (sans
tenir compte des frais de transport). Bien entendu, Les 166vaLuations et
ddvatuations  perturbent ces rapports, ce qui pose des problcames  quant A
Iruniformit6 des prix agricoLes et du libre 6change dans La Communaut6.
MaLheureusement,  cette situation ne srest que trop souvent confirm6e
dans La pratique.
D6vatuation du franc frangais
A La fin des ann6es 60, cren 6tait fini  de La relative stabiLjt6 6conomique
qui avait pr6vaLu jusque LA. Des divergences entre les taux dtinftation, de
ch$mage, de croissance 6conomique des divers Etats membres, notamment entre
La Fnance et LrALLemagne, aboutirent A des pressions qui atteignirent Leur
paroxysme i  La fin des ann6es 60 Lonsque La faib[esse du franc franqais et
La vigueur du mark aLlemand nendaient indispensabLedes  changements de
parit6.
Le 11 aofit 1969, Le franc frangais fut d6vatu6 de 11,11 %. Lorsqutun  pays
d6value sa monnaie, ses prix agricoLes (ctest-i-dire Ies prix communs fix6s
en UC et exprim6s dans La monnaie nationaLe) devraient  normaLement augmenter
dans Ies mpmes proportions puisque Ltunit6 de monnaie nationaIe se d6vatue
en tenmes dtUC. Si te march6 des produits agrico[esest exc6dentaire,  Le prix
de march6 suit de tr€s prds [e prix drintervention.  Pour [es produits dont
KOMMISSIONEN  FOR DE EUROPIEISKE;FIELLESSKABER - KOil,MISSION DER EUROPAISCHEN  GEMEINSCHAFTEN
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Le march6 ntest pas exc6dentaire,  Itaugmentation est moins rapide et suit
[tajustement des prix de march6. Puisque 1 UC = 5,,55 FF au Lieu de 4193706 FF,
LtaglicuLteur frangais aurait d0 nonmaIement recevoir 555 FF poun des produits
drune valeur de 100 UC, au Lieu de 493170 FF. Une tet[e augmentation de prix
aurait entrain6 La hausse des prix de d6taiI des denn6es aIjmentaires et 6ven-
tueLLement une diminution de la demande sur [e march6 int6rieur et une stimuLa-
tion de La production. IL aurait 6gaLement 6t6 tres difficiLe drexpliquer  aux
producteurs des Etats membres pourquoi jLs nraILaient pas profiter des avantages
dont [eurs concurrents frangais b6n6ficiaient brusquement, tandis que Les tra-
vaitLeurs des secteurs non agricoLes du mBme Etat membres verraient dans Lraug-
mentation des prix des denr6es aLimenta'ires  une justification de Leur revendica-
tions saLariates. En cons6quence, jL fut donc d6cid6 quren France Les prix d6cid6s
pan tes autorit6s ntatteindrajent  que progressivement Ieur nouveau niveau, crest-
A-dire en deux ans.
Les difficuLt6s cr66es par La bnusque augmentation des pnix minima garantis se
trouvaient ainsi att6nu6es, nais en mtme temps des nouveaux  probLdmes  sungissaient
du fait  que Le taux de change de LrUC en monnaie nationate (Le taux "vert" est
utiLisd excLusivement  en agricuLture) 6tait maintenant diffdrent du taux de change
du march$. Un producteur frangais aurait pu vendre sa production A un onganisme
dtintervention drun autne Etat membre o0 les autorit6s aur3lent 6t6 obLig6es
draccepten les produits aux prix garanti en UC, exprim6 en monnaie nationaLe
au taux de change fix6, Les autonit6s de LtALLemagne de LrOuest, par exempLe,
auraient d0 payer 400 DM des c6r6ates drune vaLeun de 100 UC et ce montant
aurait pu 6tre 6change imm6diatement par te producteur  dans nrimporte queLte
banque contre des francs frangais catcul6s au taux du marchd, i  savoir 555 FF.
Ajnsi, Les producteurs frangajs auraient pu b6n6ficier imm6diatement de Iraug-
mentation de prix. Afin drdviter que les organismes drintervention des autres
Etats membres ne soient jnond$s de produits frangais ou de produits int6rieurs
ddptac6s, un syst|me de subventions aux importations  A Ia fronti6re en France
et de taxes sur Les exportations,  ionnu sous Le vocabLe de montants compensa-
toires mondtajres (MCM) fut instaur6, les producteurs frangais perdant Lravantage
de prix d6cou[ant de ta d6valuation de [eur monnaie et tes producteurs  des
autres Etats membres se tnouvant du m0me coup prot6g6s contre ta concurrence
des produits frangais moins chers.
Re6vatuation  du Deutsche Mark
Deux mois ptus tard, LtideaL du march6 unique subit un nouveau contrecoup
du fait de ta r66vaLuation du Deutsche Mark de 9,29 %. IL en r6sulta une
situation inverse A ceLLe cr66e par suite de La devaLuation  du franc franqais.
Th6oriquement, ceLa aurait d0 avoir pour effet de r6duire Les prix minima
aItemands; mais pour des raisons potitiques, iL 6tait absolument hors de question
drenvisager  une diminution du revenu des agricuLteurs. II  fut donc d6cide de main-
tenir Les prix agricoLes A Leur ancien niveau, mais ceta posa de nouveaux probtdmes.
De mlme que La d6vaLuation  du franc frangais avait faiLIi provoquer une inondation
des autres Etats membnes par des produits agricotes franqais, LrALLemagne nisquait
maintenant de devenir une cib(e dfexportation pour [es producteurs  de [a Communaut6,
et ce pour deux rajsons : premidrement,  tous Les producteurs de ta Communaut6
6taient en mesure de vendre rhoins cher que Les producteurs  aLLemands sur nfimporte
queL manche; deuxidmement,  [es autorit6s aILemandes offraient toujours 400 DM pour
des produits drune vaLeur de 100 UC. Au taux r6et du DM (3166 DM ='1 UC), cela
signifiait que [es agricuLteurs des autres pays vendant des produits A un organisme
dfintervention aLLemand auraient pu toucher 9,29 % de plus dans [eun propne monnaie
qutits nfauraient regu sriLs avaient vendu Ieurs produits au prix drintervention
dans Leur pnopre pays. De nouvgau, des montants compensatoires mon6taires durent, -3
6tre instaur6s : des subventions A !rexportation 6taient vers6es aux producteurs
alLemands pour compenser [a perte de comp6titivit6 de Leurs produits sur drautres
march6s, tand'is que Ies avantages quren retiraient [es producteurs drautres Etats
membres 6tafent annu[6s par trimposition de taxes A Irexportation.
'  EvoLution de La situation depuis. 1971
Les MCM ont 6t6 introduits dans Le but de prot6gen Le systdme drjntervention de
ta pAC et dt6viter des djstorsions de concurrence. Un p16LBvement i  Lrexportatjon
a 6t6 cr66 poun dissuader Les n6gociants frangais de vendre Leurs pnoduits A des
organismes drintervention 6trangers et.pour emp€cher Ies sp6cutateurs dracheter
en masse des pnoduits agrico[esfranqais A bon compte dans Irintention de r6atiser
rapidement un bdn6fice en Les revehdant A des entrepSts drinterventjon  aLLemands-
Une subve.ntjon a 6td inst"aur6e sur Les importations en France, i  titre  de compen-
sation de La perte de competitivit6 des produits dtautres Etats membres devenus
reLativement pLus chers. Le systdme inverse srappLiquait en ALtemagne', des sub-
'  ventjons 6tant vers6es i  Lrexportation et des pr6tevements per9us e Lrimportation.
Le montant des MCM d6pendait de ta diff6rence entre te "taux vertil et te taux de
change du march6 de [a monnaie nationale et de lrunit6 de compte. Ces diff6rences
moneiajres, exprim6es en pourcentage, etaient aLors appLiqu6es A certains prix
communs/ pour qutiL soit possible de caLcuter tes vaLeurs absoLues  des MCM A
percevoir ou 6 verser. En fajt,  eLLes rep16sentaient Itincidence sur [es prix
de La diff6rence entre Les taux de change.
Des dispositions furent prises en France pour atigner tes prix franqais sur [es prix
communs par [a d6vaLuation du taux vert sur une p6r'iode de deux ans et en AlLemagne
par la r6evaIuation du taux vert sur une p6riode de quatre ansi toutefois, LtappIica-
tion des MCM sr6tendit et fut mdintenue au-delA de 1970 afin de tenter de conserver
Irunit6 du march6 Lorsque toutes Les monnaies europ6ennes abandonndrent La parit6
fixe avec Le do[lar et donc avec LrUC.
En aogt 1971, Les Etats-Unis subprim6rent [a convertjbiIit6  du dottar en or et
cette monnaie se mit A fLotter sur Les march6s mon6taires  mondiaux. En decembre
de La mQme ann6e, L t anci en syst$me  f ut remp Lac6 par lr accord de t^lashi ngton, aux
termes duquei Ies pays convenaient de Limjter Les fLuctuations de parit6 A environ
ZrZS7-.u-de..rs o,  au-dessous  du-taux centraL d6cLa16. En mars 1972, IrALLemagne de Ltouest
Ia Betgjque, Le Luxembourg, Les Pay's-Bas et La France deciderent de limiter Les
ftuctultions  de teurs taux de change i  plus ou moins 11125 7., en formant  un
t'serpent''a['int6rieurdu,'tUnne[''deL|accorddeWashington.Lestauxde
change "verts" 6taient encore bas6s sur Le dernier rapport de parit6 d6cLar6'au FMI'
Avec Ltadh6sion du Royaume-Uni, du Danemark et de lrlrLande, ce taux fut consid616
comme d6passe et desilt.u* rep16sentatifs"  furent introduits.par ces pays, bases
su,r Le taux de change appLiqu6 en 1973 entre te doLLar et La Livre, par exempLe.
La deuxidme  d6vaLuation du dotLar au printemps 1973:acc6t€'ra La decision des pays
dont Les monnaies se tnouvaient dans Le "serpent" drabandonner les Liens
de L.eur monnaie avec Le dotLar et de [es'Laisser ftotten conjointement. Les MCM
6taient aLors calcul6s sur [a base de La moyenne non ponder6e de ces monnaies et
La vateur de LtUC d6pendait de Leur app16ciatjon  ou de Leur d6pr6ciation  g6n6raLe.
Ainsi, les taux de change du marche et les taux de change verts des monnaies du
"serpent" de mEme que Les MCM 6tajent fixes. A Lrext6rieur du"serpent", tes MCM
demeuraient variabLes; puisque dans Les Etats membres en cause Les monnaies 6taient
f tottantes.
De 1971 e p78, ta monnaie aLLemande et Les monnaies des pays du Bene[ux furent
toutes r66vatu6es, Le DM de 15r11 %, Le f Lorin de 7176 % et le FB de 2,76 %.
La couronne danoise fut devatu6e de 13 % au total. Les monnaies de LrltaLie,.  _t+_
'  ce qui
de La Frpnce, du Royaume-Un] et.de LrIrLande se mirent A f[otter'
revenejt en f ait ;-;;;  ;ev.t..l.ti.o; l.-.r''"irn".{:  t"t  monnai.es' mais.seLon
des taux diff6..nirl'ir-u.Leun  d!'tiUC gtait Li6e i  ceLLe des monna'res
du ,,serpent,,, et notamment  , au 1!, 
[es ta-ux Y"'t": des monnaies qui f Lottaient
L.ibrement 6taient sur6vaLuees.n'r.i.on J. t" a"prJti"tion con::ante et rapide
de i;es monnaies face a Leur tfottemint conjoint' drou une augmentation des MCM
n6satifs, notamment dans te cas ;;";;;t;;q:Ytt''d;  'i'lrLande et de LrItaLie'
dont Les monnai"r''r"-ront rapiaeilni-iepreci6es  ap le' PZ+'
Montants compensatoi  res -mon6iai res
Ecart mon6taire  a1rpLlcaoLe  Le
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Inci dence i Lus L terme du s):lgme ro-mon6taire
Depui s 1976, Lrltatier.te Danemark et LrIrLande ont toujours essay6 dt6viter
drintroduire des MCM n6gatifs ou at,,-*oins dren Limiter ie montant' afin del tirer
parti de revenu, lg'if.ii",  et"ugs et d'6viter ou de r6duire Les pn6[bvements
frappant Leurs "r;;,i;;iql:  :nricoLes' Le Rovaume-uni' importateur net de
produits ag.icoLes, a.prefdre evii". unt devaLuation  du taux vert afin de continuer
A beneficier de prix ir La consom;;i;"; J"'q!"y:s'Pourtant'  Le raffermissement de
La Livre sterLing vis-A-vis au Ooiitt "l' 
.,Zg'1950 i  contribue i  6Liminer Les MCM
n6gatjfs en viguiur dans f",noy"Jt"-uni et a 6t6;  it"iiglne des MCM positifs sans
que Le Royaume-uni .it  eu A i*po]"i i,n. iotie,devaLuation.du taux vert' Tous tes
Etats membres dont [es monnai"r.""t JIJ r6evaLuees ont 6t6 Pa$ encLins a r66vaLuer
Les taux vents parce que ceux-..,".r..i"nt-"nirrln.  une redu'ctTon du revenu des
agricuLteurr.t rn" baisse des taxes A Lt'import'fion q'i  forment une protection
contre Les concurrents 6tnange.,- in iant qur'impontateun'  on 'aurait pu srattendre
A ce que LrALLemagne demande inri*nr.nt une r6duction dei p-ix, mais ir cause des
structures reratiiement faibLes;;;;;  agricuLture et du niveau 6tev6 des revenus
dans Les secterr, non agricot"rr-i"-i"y.-ri.tt  uiu"t"ni oppose A toute reduction
des MCM.
7non6taire,a6t6misaupojntpoureviterLesmouvementsbrusques
Le systdme agro-r  ,i!:  --!:^^^  .r^e +rrrv dp chanoe. Poun Les produits
:i;;ililaiEr"o.i"rrit"  de modifications des taux de chanse. Poun Les prequrt>
--.,ontjnn  das orix  eLeves ont 6te generaLement eI  -lnconl['uLq:) vqr  ix  e Leves ont 6te generaLeme
iair"nt Ltobjet de mesures drintervent'ion' des pr
.i ^^ aa c^nt :nnr6c'i6es et  Les pri x sont
;:l;i!|r:;:l:"r",  pays dont Les monnaies se sont appr6ci6es et Les prlx sonr
,,^--^:  oani d6nr6ci6es et ou Lg taux vert
Iil::;!:'b::';";:.L:;';';"it''i"'  monnaies se sont d6pr6ci6es et
nr a gudre subi drajustements'-5-
L,apptication  de taux verts sembLait justifi6e a court terme, mais certains effets
pernicieux sont apparus a pLus-Long terme. -La manipuLation, d Lr6cheLon nationa['
des niveaux a. p.jl-"ri  .oirtr.ire 5 la notion de potitique agricole commune et de
prix communs au sein de La CEE, Ui"n qr" draucuns aient soutenu que cettb diff6ren-
ciation a 6gaLement  assur6 rn" ptrt grande stabiLite des prix dans Les Etats membres
et 6vit6 de U.rrqr"r-.t'."ng"t"nts,'inicceptabLes  sur Ie pLan poLitique'
Njveau des prix 
i
Par suite de L'applicat'ion du systdme agrojmon6taire, L": qfix communs'  exprim6s
en monnaies nationaLes, ont eu tendance a divergen et a infLuencer Ia production
des Etats membres. La diVergence entre Les prix-nationaux ressort du tabteau
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IL est evident que Les producteurs  d'rEtats membres dont les monnaies ont 6t6
.ee"rir.". obtiennent un pnix sup6rieur A ceLui qurobtiennent Leurs concurrents
drEtats membres dont la monnaie a deva[ue. Si une augmentation des prix communs
nraffectait pas Les MCM, Lt6cart entre Les monnaies nationaLes serait encore 
7
accentu6. En drautnes tenmes, une augmentation de prix de 10 z signifierait que
Les agricuLteurs de La Repubijque  federaLe toucheraient 283r52 DM (+ 25r75 Dt'1)'
tandis que Le chiffre correspondant (en DM) en France ne serait que 245161 DM
G 22,33 DM).
En drautres termes, les agriiuIteuis frangais ntobtiendraient  que 87 % de La
hausse ree I Le des pr i x en A L Lemagne.
par aiLIeurs, La suppression 6ventue.LLe  des MCM affecterait aussi Les revenus'
Ainsi, La decision de Les supprimer impLiquerait  une baisse des prix agricoLes
dans Le Royaume-Uni, en ALLemagne et aux Pays-Bas, qui b6neficient des MCM
positifs. bi on reLevait Le niveau des prix communs par La m€me occasion pour
compenser cette baisse des revenus agricoLes, jL en 16suLterait une vive hausse
aes prix en ItaLie, en BeLgique/ au luxembourg et en Francer 6tant donn6 que-ta.
suppression  des MGM negatiis dans ces pays entrainerait une augmentation des prix
'  de soutien des produits agricoLes, exprim6s dans La monnaie
(c)  I  (d)
coLonne (b) exprim6| DM = 100

















































nationaLe de ces pays, en pLus de Lraugmentation
en UC. Le Danemark, la Grdce et Lrtrrlande o0 il
se situent donc effectivement  au niveau des prix
que Itaugmentation d6cid6e par Le ConseiL.
des pnix communs exPrimds
nrexiste pas de MCM et qui
commun!, n robtiendrai ent
P_roducteurs et consommgteurs
Si Le,systeme agro-monet.ir.e ntavait pas 6t6 cr66, iL y aurait.tout Ijeu de
penser que ttautmentation des prix des produ'its aurait entraine pour centains
secteurs une augmentation pLus rapide de La prgduction dans LeS Etats membnes
i  monnaje depreci6e, pour autant que Le'permettent Les condjtions natur'eLLes
et Les ressources disponibLes, De'm6me, La consommation de certains produits
aLimentairbs aurait bajss6, Lrinverse se serait produit dans Les pays dont La
monnaie srest appr6ci6e. Dans La pnatique/ cependant,  comme Les pnix des facteurs
de production non agricoLes refLetent [es taux de change normaux du march6 '
[e systdme de MCM dEcourage r6elLement [a production dans des pays A monnaie.
f aibte, La co,nsommation 6iant maintenue gr'6." b des prix moins 6lev6s, ce qui
est un ph6,nomdne jnverse de ce qurentralnerait normaLement une d6vaIuetion'
Dans [es pays 6 monnaie r66vaLu6e, ou Les prix agricoLes sont.pLus 6tev6s que
chez [eurs voisins, la pnoduction peut 6tre maintenue a un niveau pLus 6Lev6
que ce nraurait 6t6 Le cas autrement.
Le systdme mon6tai ne ne constitue  cependant  QrJu.n d'es f acteurs inf Luenqant La .
ienaance de la production. agricole et iL est difficile  drisoLer son infLuence
de celLe d'autres facteurs teLs que La terre et Le cLimatrLes facteurs structureLs,
Itincidence des garanties et des prix d6couLant de Lt6Largissement de La CEE,
La situation ".oiorique 
g6neraLe et les catastrophes natureLLes.  Lr6votution
de la production est'.rrri  infLuencee  pan Les exc6dents et Les p6nunies sur Le
march6 et par Les poLitiques nationaLes et communautaire.  Quoi quriL en soit,  ,
certaines branches de production ont 6t6 djrectement  touch6es- ,Par exempLe,
La production draLiments transfor.m6s a augment6 -dans Le Royaurne-Uni, d cause
notamment des prix inf6rieurs des matidres premi6res dont [ | importation e,st
;;;;;ii"nnJ..lnri  que du fait  que certains de ces aLiments tnansform6s  ne
sont pas fnappds de taxes d L'exportation'
Incidence sur Les 6 changes 
I enn I i carinn ,pq  e di storsion Au-dela dtune p6riode limit6e, LtappLication des MCM provoque un
des 6changes due au fait  qutiis alisscr"lt essentieLLement sur Les prix finaLs
des produi.ts 
"gricoLes et non sun Le co0t des facteurs de production- Dans un
pays dont La monnaie ,srest appreci6ercomme La RepubLique f6deraLe drALIemagne,
[e producteun b6ndficie g6n6naLement dtun faibLe taux d.rinflation pour Le co0t
de la.main-droeuvre, des-6quipements et des machines et drune r6duction du co0t
de Lr6nergie import6e et drautres facteurs de production, ce qui est une cons6-
qr.n." Jii.cte b" Ltapp16ciation  de sa monnaie (dans La pratique, toutefois,
iL stav6re que ces co0ts neduits sont rarement r6pencut6s sur Li"nriculteur).
SimuLtan6ment,  Le systdme des MCM Lui fournit une subvention ir Lrexportation
destin6e A .orpenser Ltincidence de La r66vatuation de sa monnaie sur Le prix
de vente de ses produits dans Les autres monnajes. Par aiLLeurs, Le producteur
dtun pays A monnaie pLus faibLe, pan exempLe [a France, supporte g6neraLement
un taux drinfLation pLus 6Leve du co0t de ses facteurs de production, notamment
Le coot de Lt6nergie', des engrais et des aLiments du betaiL import€'s,  m6me si
Le taux vert est irpid"r"nt d6vaLu6 en vue dr6viter Ltintroduction de MCM negatifs'
paraLLALement, Lrexistence  de MCM pos'itifs en ALtemagne s'ignifie que Le. producteur
'f rangajs es,t ioumis, pour Les ventes quri L effectue dans ce pays, i  un p16Leve-
ment d Lrexportation qui LtempBche de tirer parti de lravantage concurrentieL
que la d6preciation reLative'du franb Lui aurait conf6ri sur Le march6 aLLemand'
Dans La mesune oir Les MCM ne sont pas rapidement supprim6s, ils  ont tendance
;-;;rt;.b".-f".6changes, crest-A-dire A encounager un mouvement des pays A prix
6leves vers les pays 6 bas Pr"ix.-7-
L'effet pernicieux peut devenir significatif si Lr6cart entre Ies monnaies
qui srapprecient et Les monnaies qui se d6p16cient entraine le versement
dr importants MCM cumuL6s.
La sp6cuLatiori sur Ies changements mon6ta'ires srest toujours manifest6e dans Ies
g.rrrng"r. LtincLusion dtun 6t6ment de co0t destine a couvrir ces changements
augmenterait te prix dans des proportions teLLes que Les 6changes sren trOuVeraient
paraLys6s. IL est possible de parer partietLement i  ce risque majntenant grtce ir
i.  p.Stixatjon aes-mim; rris  LtinfLuence drautres facteurs sroppose A une anatyse
exhaustive des effets iirects du systdme agro-mon6taire sur Ies sch6mas  des
6changes.'
coOt budg6tai re
L,apptication  des MCM constitue, pour Le budget'des communaut6s  europeennes,
une charge qui a toutefois djmjnu6 depuis La creation du SME. Les pays qui
beneficient Le pLus des transferts budg6taires sont Les pays importateuns nets
dont La monnai. ri"ti  d6pneciee et qui beneficient drun taux vert non d6pr6cie,
teLs que La Grande-Bretagne au miLjeu des ann6es 70. LrltaLie a aussi b6neficie
de subventions a itirpo.iation, mais dans une moindre mesurer 6tant donn6 que
La Livre verte a etd be.ioaiqrement d6vaLu6e dans Le but dteLimjner Les MCM
n6gatifs etr paf.onreqrant, dtaugmenter  Les revenus des agricuLteurs et de
stimuLer Ia pnoduction-
Par aiLLeurs, des MCM positifs appLiqu6s e !9s..'importateurs nets dont La
monnaie stapp16cie, teLs que La RepubLique federaLe, d6gagent des recettes
budgetaires  suppL6menta'ires pour La communaut6 sous forme de taxes a Lrimporta-
tion, Par contre, La maintien de pnix eLev6s entraine une augmentation des
co0ts drintenve"ii"". J". MCM positifs contribuent aussi au nalntien des
exportations  O"r piyr A monnaie forte vers Les pays i  monnaie faibLe' Ces
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[a section garantie du FEOGA
U!itisation de LrECU
pendant toute L'ann6 e 1977, de nombreuX  debats ont et6 consacr6s e Ltintroduction
drune unite de compte 
",4rop6"nne 
dans Le secteur agricoLe, qui serait Liee i  un
panier pond616, compos6 des monnaies de.tous Les Etats membres' 0n esp6rait
ainsi rapprocher La'politique agricoLe de la 16aLit6' Le panier pond616 que
constitue L'ECU ";pe'rh" 
Les prii,  exprim6s dans une monnaie qui se d6prdcie,
de srembatt". roJr-i" pr"ttion des monnaies fortes et supprime Lrirr6guLarit6
qui veut que Les monnaies faibLes supportent Le poids des ajustements'
RempLacer L'UC par LTECU supposait que Lron adoptSt un taux de conversion '
car L'ECU etait infdrieur de 20 y. e LrUC, ce qui obLigeait a diminuer Les
prix communs si La conversion se faisait seton Lr6quation 1 ECU = 1 UC'
Le 9 avni L lg1gr-fui p.ix agricoLes communs, exprim6s en UC et convertis
en ECUS, ont ete soumis au ioefticient 1r11egfi (crest-i-dire  1 r2O ECIJ = 1 UC)'
Le taux vert a etJ-soumis au.mame coeffiiient dans Le but de maintenir Le niveau
des prix courants.
ExemP[e : 100 tJC x 3140 =
121ECU x 2,81 =
340 DM
340 DM
FEOG A titre t Lions drucE)-8-
Lrutitisation de ttECU plut6t que de trUC en vigueur avant Ir6tabLissement'du'
SME re,vpt une importanbe panticuLiere si tton songe au montant excessif des
MCM negatifs vers6s pendant La p6riode p16c6dente  ou ttUC 6tait'Iiqaux monnajes
du ttseipent" par napport auqueL tep autres monnaies avaient tendance A se
d6pr6cier. Comme Ies prix communsr]exprim6s dans Ies monnaies qui se d6p16cient
augmentaient, Les pays A monnaie pLqs faibLe 6taient incit6s A d6vaLuer Leurs
talx verts ei don. A augmenter Leuns prix int6rieurs qui augmentaient d6ji i
un rythme pLus papide que Les prjx drun pays A monnaie ptus forte. Les aug-
mentations  des pr:jx rEricro[es en faveur des pays A monnaie depr6ci6e ont 6t6
duesrdans une Large te.r." A La d6vaLuation  des taux verts ptut6t quraux
d6cisions annuettes dtaugmentation  des prix. Les MCM nouveLLement  cr66s dans Le
cadre du SME ont tendance A 6tre mieux partagd's entre MCM positjfs et MCM
nJg"ifis. ninsi, iL devient impossibLe dtaugmenter fortement Les prix "A La
,sauvette", particuLierement  dans Les Etats membres ou te taux dtinflation est
sup6rieur e'La moyenne. La cons6quence  en est que pour obtenir un rdsu[tat donn6
en termes de revenus agricoLes, Lrai.rgmentation des prix exprim6s en ECU doit
Stre pLus importante  qurauparavant. ta nouvel[e unjt6 de compte'de type "panier"
constitue La p'ienre anguLaine du systeme mon6tajre europ6en; eLLe a pour effet
de r6tabLir des taux de change fixes entre tes Etats membres intenesses et de
reintroduire des marges de fLuctuation fixes de pLus ou mojns ?r25 % pour les sept
monnaies et de pLus ou moins 6 7. pour La Lire. On esp6rait ainsi pouvoin se
ibsser en partie des MCM. Une franchise de 115 point fut conservde poun Les pays
A MCM n6gatifs et une autre dtun point fut instaur6e pour Les nouveaux MCM posi-
tifsr  6tant entendu que ces nouveaux MCM seraient supprim6s en deux ans.
pour le moment, toutefois, La Livre sterLing ne fait  pas partie de ce systdme.
La Lire, e.LLe aussi, a une marge de fluctuation de 6 %. Pour ces raisons et
compte tenu de Itadhesion'de la Grdce, Les MCM paraissent  encore n6cessaires.
Apr6s deux ans drune relative stabiLit6, les mouvements  r6cents de taux de
change qui se sont op6r6s dans le SME ont repLac6 sous Les feux de lractuatite
Les MCM et les probldmqs qui en d6couLent-
0n admet g6n$raLement que si un Etat membre modjfie son taux de change, iL peut
demanden un ajustement immddiat de son taux vert afin dt6viter Ltintroduction
de MCM'ou d,en Limiter Le montant. Presque tous tes Etats membres qui ont
d6vaLu6 r6cemment ont us6 de cette f acuLt6, au moins part'iet Lement, ma'is
aucun des Etats membres qui ont r66vaLu6. Pbr aiLLeurs, Irajustement des
taux verts est g6neraLement n6goc'i6 au sein du ConseiL et sropdre dans te
cadre des travaux annueLs de fixation des prix agricoles. Les modifications
de MCM quj en 16su Ltent ent nent nor'lna Lement en vigueur' au d6but de La campagne
de commerciaLisation  des divers produits.-9-
ExempLes dt6changeb  entre Etats membres portant excIusfvement  sur du beurre,
frais de transport non compris (15 avril 1982)
1. Echanges entre un pays i  qonnaie forte et un
France I  pays d monnaie faibLe -MCM n6gatifs- taxes A Irexportation -
Betgique J  subventions A ttimportatiol
AtLemagne I pays A monnaie forte -  McM positifs - taxes A
Pays-Bas 1 subventions i  Lrexpontation
a. Beurne frangais destine A LtAtLemaW
Prix drintervention du beurre en 1981'1982
t I imoortation -
=  J 178,40 Ecus
=  19 345,52 FF (1) 3 178r40 Scus x 6108656 FF (taux iepr6sentatif frang.)
i ) [rexportateur  frangai s verse i  t torgani sme dr inter-
vention frangais un MCM de :
1 % x 19 315,52 FF
Pri x A La frontiere franga i se
ii)  l.'importate,ur aU.emanci pa't€ a t]organisme drinter-
vention aLLemand un ivlCM de :
8 1 de 3 178140 Ecus x 2,65660 DM (taux repr6sentatif  =
aLtemand)
1 Dll = 2,56212 FF
P"ix de vente au d6taiLlant (sans frais de transport
n'r maiqe beneficiaire)
Compa16 orix dr iniervention  aL Lemand
=  193145










=  I 730,71
=  21 269,68
=  g 301 ,59
=  $ 443,74 AU
b. tseunne aLLemand destin6 A [a France
Prix drintervention ciu beurre en 1981-1982
3 178r4O E;us x 2165660 DM (taux neprdsentatif alLemand)
i)  MCM restitu6 i  lrexportateur aLLemand :
8%x8443,74D14
Prix A La frontiere aLLeniande
ii)  lvlCM restitue d trimporlateur franlais
1 % de 3 178,4A Ecus x 6,08656 FF (taux repr6sentatif
franqai s)
Pnix de vente au ddtaiLLant


















(*) La diff€rence srexpLique par  Irexistence de
ftucttations des taux de' change.
franchfses et par Les:  10 -
2. Echanges entre deux pays A monnaie fortq
Beurre n6erLandais destind A IrALLema'gne
Prix drintenvention du beunne en 1981/82
3 178,40 EcuS x 2,81318, HFL ,ff:i 
|.:;!:i:;.tat 
i f
i)  Lrexportateur n6erIandais touche une restitution
4 % x 8 g41r41  HFL
, Prix A la fronti6re n6erIandaise'
ii)  Lr'importateur aLlemand paie un MCM de :
8 % de 3 1,78'40 Ecus x 
';!lf3?t?*.[til:.!;0,"-
1 DM = 1,10537 HFL
Prix de vente au d6tailLant
compan6 au prix dtintervention  aLLemand
3. Echanges entrq deux pays A monnaie f?ibLe
Beurre fr:angais destin6 A La Belgique
Prix dfintervention du beurre en 1981-82
3 178140 ECU x 6108656 FF (taux repr6sentatif
francai s)
i ) Ltexportateur  f ranga'is pai e un MCM de :
1 % x 19 345,52 FF
Prix A La frontidre franqaise
ii)'Lrimportateur beLge touche une restitution  de
8r1 % x 3 178,40 Ecus x 4017985 BF (taux repr6-
sent at i f  be Lge )
1 FF = 7121415 BF'
Prix de vente au d6taitLant
compar6 au prix dtintervention  beLge
=  675 r50 Dl[
=  746t68 HFL (3)
=  9 330,43 HFL ()-(2)+(3)
=  8 441100 DM
=  8 443'74 Dn
=  3178140
=  8 941t41
de:
=  357 166





=  3 178140







= 10 503,59 BF
=  1 445,97 FF (3)
= 18 093,00 FF (1)+(2)-(3)r
=130 525,61 BF
=129 673t95 BF
Les organismes drintervention paient Le soLde entre Les montants requs ou pay6s
par Le FE0GA au titre  des MCM.
Les Etats membres sont responsabLes de Leurs pnopres MCM, sauf.dans Le cas
drimportation dans Les pays a MCM n6gatifs ou Lrexportateur paie Les MCM
sous 16serve drun accord entre les piys concern6s. Cette disposition (articLe 2
bis) du rdglement 974/71) srappLiquaii en ltaLie et en GnAce le 15 avriL 1982'-11-.
4. Comparaison,  A Rotterdam, entre [es prix drun mais frangais et drun
mals importd des Etats-Unis (frais de transport compris)





vent i on )
n6 er Landa i se
=;: fJJ dotLars






1 doLLar = 2168805 HFL
Pr6Levement Le 15 avrit
86,12 Ecus x 2181318 (taux
Landais)
MCM n6erLandais :
4 /" (2,81318 x 1 65 ,23 Ecus
Frais de tnansoort A trusine
1 HFL = 2131789 FF
Mais charg6 A Cnei L (France)
Maj orat i ons mensue L Les
MCM frangais :
1 % (6108656 (taux rep16sentatlt trancais)
x' 165,?3)
Montant du fret entne Crei I et Les Pays-Bas
( Rott erdam )
Frai s











pour tenir compte des taux du march6- ('k) Coef f i ci ent mon6taire appIique